The Stigma of Personality Disorder and Philosophical Problems about Personality. On Tyrer and Mulder, Part 3
This is my third and for now final entry on Tyrer and Mulder’s recent book on personality disorder. In previous entries, I looked at the problems with the old categorical way of classifying personality disorders and the arguments for a dimensional approach, such as is found in ICD-11 or the DSM-5 Alternative Model. I want to step back now and examine some of the larger implications of this book. First, I will consider what the authors have to say about stigma. This will lead naturally to my underlying working thesis: that there are underlying philosophical problems with concept of personality disorder, philosophical problems connected to how we think about selfhood and moral character. These problems do not disappear simply by operationalizing the term “personality” in more sophisticated ways. There is no doubt that, at present, personality disorders are heavily stigmatized diagnoses. The authors cite extensive empirical evidence of this in Chapter 9 (pp. 98-111). They also reprise...