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Kinds of Kinds, cont'd: Dissections Pharmacological and Otherwise

 I have recently been working my way through Peter Kramer’s 1993 classic, Listening to Prozac: A Psychiatrist Explores Antidepressant Drugs and the Remaking of the Self. It has turned out to be quite different than I expected. I had run into the title in several histories of psychiatry (e.g., Anne Harrington’s Mind Fixers [2020]) and was generally under the—mistaken, I now realize—impression that the book fit squarely into the biologically-reductionist hype machine that surrounded the introduction of drugs like Prozac in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These days, it is quite common to look back on the early 1990s as a time of irrationally exuberant optimism about psychiatric medications, a kind of period of neo-Hippocratic humoral theory about serotonin (Kramer himself, somewhat ironically, I think, refers to serotonin and norepinephrine as “neurohumors”), a return of the repressed biological dimension to psychiatry and society writ large—when the Human Genome Project seemed to hold out the allure of quick fixes and even quicker explanations, and when one could still chalk depression up to a “chemical imbalance in the brain” with a straight face.

 

These currents weighed heavily on me as an adolescent and young adult, and I formed myself largely in opposition to them. A strong Romantic, anti-scientific and pro-humanistic current ran through a lot of my own thinking until I was in my late 20s. I had read Stephen J. Gould’s Mismeasure of Man in high school, and then, in college and grad school, I was drawn to phenomenology, existentialism, and German Idealism, each of which, in its own way, is opposed to the idea that we are just our genes or our “neurohumors.” In 2024, though, the biological reductionism (a term that deserves to be interrogated further) of the 1990s has been long dead or at least has been in its death its death throes for a while. The old hope that a “gene for” each of the DSM disorders would be found now seems dismally naïve, even as increasingly sophisticated genome-wide association studies and other methods of genetic research have been pioneered. The efficacy of SSRIs, the class to which Prozac belongs, has been much disputed in warring meta-analyses, and difficult-to-parse data about placebo efficacy in clinical trials have emerged. In the biological reductionist camp, the DSM itself has come under fire, with the NIMH attempting to replace it in research at least with an alternative system. Drug makers have largely withdrawn from funding new psychiatric medications. (All of these claims deserve citations beyond what I care to dig up right now from my reading notes, but two sources that cover a great deal of what I say here are the aforementioned book by Harrington and sociologist-biologist Nikolas Rose’s Our Psychiatric Future, 2019.)

 

In short, I was worried that Kramer would come across as terribly dated. I was wrong. Listening to Prozac is not a partisan screed in favor of biological reductionism about mental disorders. It is, rather, an essay, in the old-fashioned sense of the world—an exploration, a problematization, less a book with a thesis than a trying-on of different ideas and questions opened up by the clinical practice of prescribing what Kramer prefers to call thymoleptics, rather than anti-depressants, after the Greek thumos, for spirit or emotions (p. 176). (Although Kramer does not mention it, this is the word associated with the “spirited” class in Plato’s tripartite division of the city and the soul—the enforcers sitting between the guardian class and everyone else.) And Kramer is not simply writing about Prozac. As regards medication, this is as much a book about the first two classes of so-called anti-depressants, monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), such as phenelzine (Nardil), or the tricyclics or TCAs, such as imipramine or clomipramine (Anafranil). It is also a book about lithium, the discovery of the efficacy of anticonvulsants like carbamazepine for mood disorders, and amphetamines.

 

I see three main themes in the book. First, Kramer is writing at a kind of point of inflection, and he is aware of it. The 1980s had seen something of a civil war in American psychiatry between the dominance of psychoanalysis—which, most commentators on the subject note, had never achieved such promise in European psychiatry—and biological approaches claiming the mantel of Kraepelin. The war is the subtext for some of the stranger decisions in DSM-III, as Nasser Ghaemi has argued in the case of the construct of major depressive disorder. It was typified in the lawsuit Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, in which the depressed nephrologist Dr. Ray Osheroff sued the prestigious Chestnut Lodge psychoanalytic clinic for not prescribing him medications; the warring factions lined up as expert witnesses on either side of the case. (For a discussion of the importance of this case, see this, this, and above all Rachel Aviv’s new book Strangers to Ourselves.) Kramer does not mention the Osheroff case, but he is reflective about the turn from a primarily psychoanalytic understanding of mental illness and personality to the new biological approaches drawn from psychopharmacology, genetics, animal studies, and sociobiology. He resists any easy answers. In many ways, he functions less here as a scientist-practitioner and more as a cultural critic taking the pulse of the moment and noticing the broader philosophical and sociological implications of this paradigm shift.

 

Second, Kramer is concerned to argue—this is perhaps the only definite thesis in the book—that Prozac and other medications do a lot more than they are advertised to do. He is particularly interested in the personality changes he observes from patients to whom he prescribes Prozac, as well as the role of Prozac in treating a variety of conditions that are in no way obviously derivative of major depression: he finds it leads to increased confidence, reduced compulsiveness, reduced rejection-sensitivity, reduced proneness to panic attacks, greater resilience in the face of stress, reduced shyness, improved self-esteem, improvements in the ability to experience pleasure (the problem of anhedonia), more organized thinking, and the treatment of a whole host of chronic low-grade matters of temperament. The evidence for efficacy is stronger in some areas than others; on the whole Kramer rarely rises to the sort of evidentiary standard that we expect today from another revolution that was beginning around this time, evidence-based medicine, with its emphasis on randomized controlled trials, systematic reviews, and meta-analyses. But the larger claim seems correct to me, namely, that the SSRIs, and also, to a certain degree, the TCAs and the MAOIs, produce a variety of different changes, some of which are deeply uncomfortable since they challenge existing ideas about the boundary between the normal and the pathological and about the appropriate limits of psychiatric intervention. These challenges are perhaps typified in the problem of what Kramer calls “cosmetic psychopharmacology,” or the possibility of prescribing these medications not in order to treat illness but rather to create desired personality modifications, to help someone achieve a “better-than-well” status (pp. x, xv, xvi, 15,97, 184, 246-249). Cosmetic psychopharm might have shifted to psychedelics, MDMA, and microdosing, the but idea, the practice, and the larger existential concerns they traffick are all still very much with us.

 

It is, however, the third main current that most interests me in this book. This is the current that comes closest to the sort of thesis one finds in science and technology studies. Kramer shows, more than he argues, that how we think about the boundary between well and ill, normal and pathological, and how we think about the nature of clinical entities themselves depends a great deal on the technical means of intervention available to us. Stated in its extreme form, this would be a kind constructivism-nominalism according which what makes something a type of mental illness, as opposed, say, to a character oddity, is the existing technological armature for modifying it. It's not disorder until we can drug it. And, in turn, what drives our search for such a technological armature is our own shifting set of cultural concerns, so that shyness, inhibition, and sensitivity to rejection, for example, only become pathological under definite social circumstances. Kramer does not actually subscribe to quite such an extreme sociologism, but he makes us feel the weight of such a position, the difficulty of avoiding such conclusions. He makes us feel the force of a claim that used to be quite commonplace in the 1960s and 1970s but seems to have largely disappeared in recent decades: that mental health professionals are, in no small part, in the business of helping people who struggle to conform to social norms conform better. We are left not so much to agree with this conclusion as to struggle with the messiness of it all, the unclarity regarding the telos of clinical practice. 

There is a deep sense of historicity and contingency in this book, perhaps most typified in the discussion of Donald Klein’s concept of rejection-sensitivity and his diagnostic category of hysteroid dysphoria in Chapter 4 (pp. 71-97). One feels how things could have been otherwise if Klein had had SSRIs at his disposal when he began his research in the 1960s. One feels how contingent and arbitrary the diagnostic categories of DSM-III and following were, how contingent and arbitrary it was that we came to see SSRIs primarily as anti-depressants. And, to his credit, Kramer recognizes that the role of technology in shaping the boundaries of the normal and the pathological does not just fall to medications. In his chapter on self-esteem, he notes that therapy, too, is a type of technology, also capable of cutting up nature, joints be damned.

 

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